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Abstract 
Scholarship on early New France has been rooted in Catholic folklore, largely shaped by heroic 
figures like Samuel de Champlain. While Champlain’s contributions to New France must not be 
ignored there remained in New France, particularly in the early seventeenth century, a substantial 
role for Protestant merchant families, both within New France and within the larger Atlantic 
community. This study examines the Compagnie de Caën and its substantial role in the 
formative years of New France arguing that groups like the de Caën family should serve to 
redefine standard conceptions of identity in this period. Ultimately the story of the early modern 
Atlantic world is far less restrictive and rigid as conventional scholarship has led us to believe.  
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In the late spring of 1628 the Merchant Adventurers to Canada, a loosely aligned group 
of English privateers sailing under the auspices of King Charles I, embarked on a voyage to 
harass French interests in the turbulent waters of the North Atlantic. At the helm for this 
particular incursion were three brothers—Lewis, Thomas, and David Kirke—Protestants who 
were at one point in their lives seemingly subjects of the king of France.
1
 Their target was to 
include the French settlements at Tadoussac, Cap Tourmente, and Quebec, now supported by 
Cardinal Richelieu’s Catholic-dominated, Compagnie des Cent-Associes and governed by 
Samuel de Champlain. The heavily outnumbered French settlers suffered immensely at the hands 
of the English invaders. Provisional ships bound for the Canadian coast, sent that same spring by 
Richelieu’s Hundred Associates, were captured at the mouth of the St. Lawrence. Farms were 
burned at Cap Tourmente. Houses were raided at Tadoussac. The Kirkes made off with 138 
cannon and large quantities of furs in addition to burning some 12 ships and forcefully removing 
a number of French colonists. While they would ultimately fail to capture the French stronghold 
of Quebec in 1628, they would return once more in 1629.
2
 This time Champlain could do little. 
A series of terse correspondences between Champlain and David Kirke revealed the inescapable 
plight of Champlain and his countrymen. Champlain delivered the following note to Kirke, 
signaling his demise: 
Gentlemen, The truth is that negligence, or the hindrances cause by the bad weather, or the perils 
of the sea have prevented the arrival of the relief that we were expecting in our suffering, and have 
put it out of our power to resist the carrying out of your design, as we did last year, without giving 
you an opportunity of making good your claims, which, if it please you, will only be realized now 
on condition of your carrying into effect the offers you made us of a composition, the terms of 
which we shall communicate to you very shortly, after we have decided on them; awaiting which, 
you will be good enough not to allow your vessels to come within cannon shot, nor attempt to set 
foot on land until everything shall have been settled between us, which will be for tomorrow. 
Meantime I shall remain, Gentlemen, your affectionate servant, Champlain.
3
 
                                                          
1
 Andrew D. Nicholls, A Fleeting Empire: Early Stuart Britain and the Merchant Adventurers to Canada, (Montreal: 
Mcgill-Queens University Press, 2010), 79. 
2
 David Hackett Fischer, Champlain’s Dream, (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2008), 414-417. 
3
 Samuel de Champlain, The Works of Samuel de Champlain, Vol. 6, ed. H.P. Biggar, trans. W.D. LeSuer (Toronto: 
Champlain Society, 1922-1936), 54-55. Published in six volumes. (Hereafter cited as Champain, Works) 
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On July, 19, 1629 Samuel de Champlain, the celebrated father of New France, ceded control of 
Quebec and its surrounding territories to the Kirkes and the Company of Merchant Adventurers 
to Canada. Days later an English flag would be hoisted on one of the fort’s citadels in 
conjunction with a series of military salvoes, thus signaling the apparent end  of French 
colonizing efforts in Canada.
4
   
At the surface the events of 1628 to 1629 merely reflected a clash of imperial rivals on 
the periphery of empire. French, English, Dutch, and Basque groups routinely sparred over 
access to the abundant fisheries of the Atlantic waters and wrangled over control of the lucrative 
fur trade. Yet what transpired in and around the waters of the North Atlantic during the early 
stages of the seventeenth century was far more complex than mere imperial jousting.  Richelieu’s 
Compagnie des Cent Associes had proven to be an unmitigated failure. Founded in 1627, the 
Compagnie des Cent Associes represented an important change in French policy towards the 
colonial administration of Canada in that only Catholics were granted permission to invest in the 
company. In the decades preceding the 1629 capture of Quebec a number of diverse French 
trading companies and monopolies, often led by Huguenots, engaged in the lucrative, albeit 
tenuous, economy of the North Atlantic and led efforts to permanently settle New France. At the 
forefront of these efforts from 1620 to 1627 was the Compagnie de Caën.  Led by two men, the 
Protestant Guillaume de Caën and his Catholic nephew Emery and made up of both Protestant 
and Catholic subordinates, the Compagnie de Caën would prove instrumental in the foundational 
period of New France. The presence, indeed centrality of the Compagnie de Caën offers a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://link.library.utoronto.ca/champlain/browse_results.cfm?lang=eng&browsetype=Subject&query=Champlain,
%20Samuel%20de,%201567-1635. (Accessed: 10/13/2010). 
4
 Champlain, Works, 6: 57-65.  
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compelling case study for matters of religious tolerance, economic opportunity, and colonial 
administrations in the seventeenth century French Atlantic.  
The Compagnie de Caën was, without question, the strongest and most influential of the 
early French Canadian trading companies. Whereas prior companies routinely neglected to meet 
established settlement quotas and failed to make important capital investments to the colonial 
infrastructure, French possessions in Canada experienced a period of unrivaled support under the 
sponsorship of Guillaume and Emery de Caën. The de Caëns would hold their monopoly for 
nearly a decade, a decade which witnessed some of the worst hostilities towards Protestants in 
France since the civil wars of the sixteenth century and, according to historian A.D. Lublinskaya, 
a decade which ushered in the advent of capitalism in France and the dawn of French 
Absolutism.
5
 Additionally, even upon the eventual loss of their fur-trading monopoly, the 
company would play the principal role in recapturing Quebec from English hands. Most 
importantly the religious configuration of the Compagnie de Caën offered a viable, and 
ultimately peaceful, alternative to increasingly restrictive policies formulated at the hands of 
Louis XIII and Cardinal Richelieu.   
The story of the foundational period of New France and of France’s role in the North 
Atlantic is one that eludes simple explanation, yet simple explanations have dominated 
scholarship on the topic. Historians have tended to emphasize divisions and tensions created by 
the religious turbulence of the early seventeenth century. But these divisions, no doubt important, 
do not tell the complete story of the seventeenth century Atlantic world, particularly from a 
French perspective. While imperial rivalry played an influential role, one cannot fully appreciate 
the complexities of the French Atlantic without also considering the multitude of ways France’s 
                                                          
5
 A.D. Lublinskaya, French Absolutism: The Crucial Phase, 1620-1629, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1968), 145.  
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internal religious struggles shaped its laws, economics, and culture in the early seventeenth 
century. Considerations must also be given to the domestic politics of continental Europe in 
order to fully appreciate sometimes incongruent imperial policies or lax enforcement on the 
periphery. Furthermore, traditional assessments of Protestant-Catholic religious conflict, both in 
France and from a broader European context, are inadequate.  
Ultimately, the Atlantic Ocean blurred traditional conceptions of national allegiance and 
allowed individuals to re-imagine possibilities of colonial identity. The oft-overlooked existence 
of the Compagnie de Caën coupled with their rivalry with the Merchant Adventurers to Canada 
demonstrated the fundamental transformation of European religious identity and challenged 
standard definitions of allegiance in the burgeoning nation-state system. There lay within the 
early modern world a “cosmopolitan diaspora, a Protestant international,” according to historian 
J.F. Bosher.
6
 Thrust into the Atlantic as a result of the religious conflicts that ravaged the 
European continent over the course of two centuries this group was composed of people hailing 
from a myriad of European polities, yet oftentimes not wholly affiliated with their homeland. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, merchants dominated much of this Protestant international. Bosher 
writes, “They freighted ships with goods for sale abroad, sent sons and nephews across the seas 
as agents in order to extend their trading circles, and corresponded with foreign trading partners. 
Such business practices gave them international contacts stronger than those of the soldiers and 
artisans of the Huguenot dispersion and different from those of the intellectuals.”7 Although 
Bosher emphasizes the linkages created within this group, there were also stark divisions shaped 
by conflict and rivalry. In some instances, families that had once resided and worshipped in the 
same coastal cities of France now waged interpersonal and imperial rivalry on the high seas.  
                                                          
6
 J.F. Bosher, “Huguenot Merchants and the Protestant International,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3d Series, 
Vol. LII, No. 1 (January 1995): 77.  
7
 Ibid, 77.  
 6 
 
The French de Caëns and the English Kirkes were two such families. The de Caëns, 
natives of the French coastal city of Dieppe, were a prominent merchant family during the latter 
stages of the sixteenth century well into the middle seventeenth century. Led by family architect 
Guillaume, they would hold a fur trade monopoly in New France, engage in the wine trade 
across the English Channel, and lease ships to those headed to the New World.
8
  What set the de 
Caëns apart from other, French merchant families, however, was the presence and importance of 
a Catholic relative, Emery. Emery appears to have sailed to the East Indies, at some point in his 
life, in addition to his service in the Atlantic.
9
 The Kirkes were in many ways very similar to the 
de Caëns, with the exception of one key area—their allegiance to England. Gervase Kirke 
(sometimes spelled Gervais or Jarvis) was born in England in 1568. Although he began as a 
landholder, at some point in his life he adopted the guild-regulated profession of the merchant 
trade, eventually marrying and setting up his own business in the port city of Dieppe—the same 
city of de Caën origin.
10
 Gervase would go on to have seven children—five sons and two 
daughters.
11
 These sons would soon meet the de Caens on the periphery of the French and 
English empires, and in doing so fundamentally alter standard conceptions of religious identity 
and national allegiance.   
The Atlantic Ocean was more than a mere void between two continents. It was an entity 
that allowed for French Protestants to imagine themselves as part of a separate community—not 
wholly French, yet not bound by their religion. For some this meant switching sides. For others, 
there were opportunities to be both French and Protestant. For others still, there appeared a third 
category, previously unrealized and uniquely tied to the Atlantic. In a world of inescapable 
                                                          
8
 Marcel Trudel. “De Caën, Guillaume.” In George Williams Brown, ed. Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online, 
http://biographi.ca/009004-119.01-e.php?id_nbr=110. (Accessed 11/30/2012). 
9
 Trudel, “De Caën, Emery.” DCB, http://biographi.ca/009004-119.01-e.php?id_nbr=111. (Accessed 11/30/2012).  
10
 Nicholls, 78-79. 
11
 Trudel, “Kirke, Gervase.” DCB, http://biographi.ca/009004-119.01-e.php?id_nbr=368. (Accessed 11/30/2012). 
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religious pluralism, the Atlantic encouraged a more amorphous understanding of one’s identity.12 
Scholars have long sought to illuminate the divisions between imperial and religious rivals, but 
have inexplicably ignored numerous examples of cooperation and cosmopolitanism in New 
France. Following the 1598 Edict of Nantes there began an increased level of religious tolerance 
both in France and in the colonies abroad. This would remain the norm until the death of Henri 
IV and the rise of Louis XIII and Cardinal Richelieu, when a more restrictive solution for the 
Protestant issue became desirable to the French monarchy.
13
 Nonetheless, Protestants would still 
play a role in French colonization of the new world throughout the seventeenth century. Not until 
the 1685 revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the adoption of the Code Noir would Protestants 
be forcefully removed from the French colonial narrative. Utilizing primarily the years between 
the initial signing of the Edict of Nantes (1598) and the return of Canada to French hands with 
the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye (1632) this study will seek to explicate the role of the 
Compagnie de Caën in the formative years of New France, and in doing so, illustrate the window 
of opportunity that existed for a more secular and cosmopolitan understanding of the early 
Atlantic world. As much of Europe descended into the chaos of the Thirty Years War and as the 
world at large suffered through a larger, general crisis, the Compagnie de Caën was in the midst 
of a pluralistic experiment built on tolerance and economic vibrancy which historians have 
inexplicably disregarded.
14
   
There is an inherent difficulty in studying early French Canada from the Protestant 
perspective.  Historical works on New France have focused on a number of disparate parts. The 
fur trade, the seigneurial system, and the economic structure of the colony comprise much of the 
                                                          
12
 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, (London: Verso, 1983), 7.  
13
 Fischer, 379. 
14
 Geoffrey Parker and Leslie Smith, eds., The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century, (New York: Routledge, 
1997). E.J. Hobsbawm, “The General Crisis of the European Economy in the 17
th
 Century,” Past & Present, No. 5 
(May, 1954): 33-53.  
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scholarship.
15
 Many of these focus on a later period, well after the foundational era of New 
France however.  Much of the scholarship that does take into account the earliest stages of the 
seventeenth century, has centered on Samuel de Champlain and his celebrated role as the father 
of New France.  David Hackett Fischer’s recent work, Champlain’s Dream examines the seminal 
role played by Champlain in the construction of New France, tracing his involvement in the 
colony throughout the course of his life. Although the work presents a comprehensive view of 
Samuel de Champlain’s role in the French Atlantic, it understates the complexity of New France 
within the larger Atlantic World during the seventeenth century, portraying Champlain as a kind 
of omnipotent hero in the development of the colony. In doing so, it neglects the important 
contributions of the Compagnie de Caën and of Protestants to the eventual progression of New 
France.  Although a veritable tome of exhaustive inquiry, Fischer’s study falls prey to traditional 
storylines of Catholic triumph in the face of Protestant antagonism and in doing so, depicts too 
narrow a view of the French experiment in the North Atlantic.  
Compounding our inability to understand the complexities of early French Canada is a 
historiographical approach shaped by uniquely Canadian and uniquely French perspectives. The 
Atlantic helps manifest an entirely different conception of identity, yet both Canadian and French 
historians tend to ignore, or fail to realize, this condition. Articulating the need for a broader, 
more Atlantic approach, Laurent Dubois writes:  
Traditionally, much of the scholarship on the French Atlantic has focused on a regional approach 
rather than an Atlantic one. Indeed, the approach of Atlantic history still has comparatively little 
traction within the French academic institutions. Though there are centers devoted to the study of 
‘la France Atlantique,’ their focus is on the towns and regions of the Atlantic coast of 
metropolitan France. In part because the French Empire in North America ended before the French 
                                                          
15
For a more thorough analysis of these topics and more, see:  Richard Colebrook Harris, The Seigneurial System in 
Early Canada: A Geographical Study, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1966), Louise Dechene’s 
Habitants and Merchants in Seventeenth Century Montreal, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1992), Eric 
Jay Dolin’s, Fur, Fortune, and Empire: The Epic History of the Fur Trade in America, (New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, 2010) and Allan Greer’s Peasant, Lord, and Merchant: Rural Society in Three Quebec Parishes, 1740-
1840, (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1985). 
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Revolution, still seen as the ‘foundational’ event in terms of the history and identity of the French 
nation, the experiences in Canada and Louisiana have remained on the edges of public memory 
and historical writing in France. In Quebec, where a great deal of excellent historical work has 
been produced about French Canada, this history has been focused primarily on exploring the 
distinct regional history of this area within North America.
16
 
 
Historian Allan Greer’s essay addressing the fractured nature of New France’s historiography 
offers further potential methods of study.
17
 Greer’s primary goal is to first define the parameters 
and geographic boundaries of “New France” and secondly, to “escape the constraints of 
parochialisms of all sorts, including national parochialisms, that have structured and channeled 
our inquiries, privileging some aspects of the past while obscuring others.”18 Like Dubois, Greer 
sees distinct merits in the Atlantic approach, writing:  
Notwithstanding the fact that France was a leading—arguably the leading—seafaring power 
through what North Americanists call the colonial period, New France tends to be overlooked in 
the Atlantic history field. If blame were assigned for this state of affairs, one would have to 
mention the reluctance of historians of the French-speaking world to embrace the Atlantic 
approaches along with the entrenched Anglo-American bias in Atlantic history. Until recently, 
New France specialists interested in an Atlantic approach received little aid or encouragement 
from scholars of ancient regime France, fixated as the latter have tended to be on France itself and 
displaying much less interest than their English counterparts in the kingdom’s overseas 
extensions.
19
 
 
This paper falls firmly in the realm described by Dubois and Greer.  By adopting a 
hypernational, Atlantic approach we can move beyond the typical constraints of nationalism, 
thus allowing us to more properly assess the complexities of colonial identity and allegiance in 
the foundational era of French Canada. Furthermore, although the examination of the Compagnie 
de Caën represents a micro approach, it nonetheless expresses values and ideas at the macro 
level, thus avoiding the trap of “anachronistic national narratives” as described by Greer.20  
                                                          
16
 Laurent Dubois, “The French Atlantic.” In Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal,  Jack P. Greene and Philip D. 
Morgan, eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 145.   
17
 Allan Greer, “National, Transnational, and Hypernational Historiographies: New France Meets Early American 
History,” The Canadian Historical Review 91, (Dec 2010), 695-717. See also Cecile Vidal, “The Reluctance of French 
Historians to Address Atlantic History,” Southern Quarterly 43, No. 4 (2006): 153-189.  
18
 Ibid, 716. 
19
 Ibid, 718. 
20
 Ibid, 716. 
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Further difficulty for the nature of this type of study lay within the dominance of Catholic 
source material for the colony. Two missionary groups, the Recollects and Jesuits, were active in 
early French Canada and the Jesuits in particular took scrupulous, detailed notes of their 
experiences in the country.
21
 Unsurprisingly, these accounts make little reference to Protestant 
influence within the colony, and typically reference only negative relations with the competing 
religion.  The writings of Samuel de Champlain offer another source of information. In spite of 
his Catholic faith, Champlain is perhaps a more neutral source as he often fostered an 
environment of toleration, as instructed by Henri IV.
22
  Beginning in 1922 and led by Canadian 
historian H.P. Biggar, a six-volume set of Champlain’s writings was compiled and translated into 
English.  This work, along with other supporting documents is available online through The 
Champlain Society, a digital history collection supported by the University of Toronto.  
Additional evidence, also in digital format, has been collected from varying sources based in 
France and Canada. These sources—a hodgepodge of correspondence between French 
governmental figures, international treaties, and appeals for financial restitution following the 
repeal of the de Caën monopoly—will serve to fill in the gaps present in the accounts of the 
Jesuits and Champlain.  Even with increased efforts at digitization however, one must read these 
sources with a keen eye.  Although the Edict of Nantes granted religious toleration to Protestants, 
it did not guarantee equal representation within the historical record. 
 
 
                                                          
21
The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents, 1610-1791, ed. Reuben Gold Thwaite. Available: 
http://puffin.creighton.edu/jesuit/relations/ (Accessed October 12, 2010). In spite of their presence and activity in 
New France during this period, little reference is made to de Caën influence in the region, and when it does, it 
typically refers only to Emery, the Catholic nephew of Guillaume.  Nonetheless the work proves valuable as we can 
corroborate claims made in Champlain’s diary during the English incursion into Quebec with that information 
available in the Jesuit Relations.  
22
 Fischer, 379-380.  
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The Edict of Nantes & Protestant Legal Identity  
We cannot hope to understand the existence of the Compagnie de Caën in the 
seventeenth century French Atlantic, without first examining the complex history of the French 
wars of religion, beginning in 1562. In no way is this meant to be a complete account—yet there 
were clear legal and cultural implications of these conflicts, which would inextricably influence 
the foundational period of New France. Catherine de Medici’s Edict of January (1562), which 
granted legal toleration to Protestantism, would plunge the country into a cycle of deadly civil 
wars for the next three decades.
23
 While Medici’s attempt at legislating religious coexistence 
would be the catalyst for conflict, there was nonetheless contention between the two sides prior. 
In a 1561 letter to Pope Pius IV, Jean de  Montluc, bishop of Valence demonstrated his fear of 
the Protestant influence on the French kingdom, writing:  
“…a quarter of his kingdom has left the communion of the church, which quarter is made up of 
gentlemen, men of letters, the chief bourgeois of the cities and the lesser people, all of whom 
know the world and are trained in arms. Thus these separated people have no lack of military 
resources, including in their number a great many gentlemen and some old soldiers experience in 
war. They have no lack of good counsel, having with them more than three quarters of the men of 
letters; they lack no money to support their affairs, for they have among them a good portion of 
the great cities and powerful families, both of the nobility and of the third estate. Furthermore 
there is such unity among them and such resolve to support each other, that there is no hope of 
dividing them and still less of bringing them back by force without putting this kingdom in danger 
of becoming prey to foreign conquest, or so weakening it that it would not return to its former 
state for fifty years.”24 
    
 Montluc may have overstated the relative strength of his Protestant rivals, but his sentiment 
nonetheless predicted some of the central problems of the next three decades. As Phillip 
Benedict has written, we may understand the wars of religion as France’s “gradual, painful 
working out of an equilibrium between the two religious parties and of a set of legal terms 
governing their coexistence that allowed religious plurality to function in a land whose deepest 
traditions rejected it, but where two faiths had become too deeply rooted to be eliminated,” yet at 
                                                          
23
 Mack P. Holt, ed., Renaissance and Reformation France, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 147. 
24
 Ibid,  4.  
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the same time, fundamentally altered the nature of subject-ruler allegiance, thus also 
transforming the nature of the French monarchy.
25
 While both of these realms were important, it 
is the “set of legal terms” that proved most significant, particularly from a Huguenot perspective. 
There would be no clearer set of legal terms than the 1598 Edict of Nantes. 
Although the Edict of January proved unsuccessful in promoting peaceful coexistence, 
the 1598 Edict of Nantes would achieve what none of the previous peace settlements had 
managed—a lasting and meaningful peace. “For all of its weaknesses, exceptions, and 
contingencies,” writes Mack Holt, “the Edict of Nantes did result in Protestants and Catholics 
agreeing to lay down their arms.”26 Furthermore, the Edict established the legitimacy of 
Protestant involvement in political and economic affairs—a development which would 
encourage Protestant participation in the colonial effort. This framework, albeit tenuous, would 
serve as a blueprint for much of the seventeenth century.  Diane Margolf writes, “Whether one is 
tracing the Huguenots’ survival in France or their assimilation overseas, law clearly plays an 
important role in the story. We have perhaps come to take for granted how much law has shaped 
the trajectory of the Huguenots’ history.”27 The newly established law of French religious 
coexistence would be continually tied to Huguenot fortunes both at home and abroad. However 
as Margolf suggests, we cannot understand the Edict solely on the terms first established in 1598.  
A strict interpretation of the document helped to undermine the Huguenot position throughout 
much of the seventeenth century.
 28
 Thus, the ebb and flow of the domestic politics of France, in 
                                                          
25
 Ibid, 147. 
26
 Mack P. Holt, The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 177.  
27
 Diane Margolf, “Identity, Law, and the Huguenots of Early Modern France.” In Bertrand Van Ruymbeke and 
Randy J. Sparks, eds., Memory and Identity: The Huguenots in France and the Atlantic Diaspora, (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 2003), 27.  
28
 Ibid, 27.  
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conjunction with the rise and fall of individual kings and their advisors, would greatly influence 
the fortunes and misfortunes of French Protestants during this period. 
Henry IV’s diplomacy in obtaining French approval of the Edict of Nantes cannot be 
overstated. Cynics propose that Henry’s decision to abjure his Calvinist faith was merely a ploy 
to help capture the crown. As Holt suggests however, though Henry was unquestionably 
motivated by politics and a desire to end the civil wars, it would be unfair to intimate that 
Henry’s conversion was either insincere or cynically made. He continues, writing:  
What (also) may not have been evident to contemporaries at the moment of his abjuration was that 
Henry IV did indeed have a plan to restore order and bring an end to the fighting: by reuniting all 
French men and women under one religion, the Catholic faith of all French kings since Cloves. 
The goal of ‘one king, one faith, one law’ was as important to Henry IV as it was his 
predecessors.
29
  
 
If ‘one king, one faith, one law’ was to be the rallying cry of Henry IV, then there would need to 
be at least some concessions to garner Huguenot support. Henry IV’s task was a difficult one—
he needed to appease Catholic moderates who had rallied to his cause, yet at the same time he 
needed to protect his former co-religionnaires. Henry IV’s approach trended towards secularism 
and established a precedent that would eventually enable the likes of the de Caëns to take part in 
the Atlantic experiment. Holt disagrees with this sentiment, arguing that a view that stresses the 
importance of secular politics is both anachronistic and misses the point of Henry’s ultimate goal 
of religious unity.
30
  But the situation created in 1598 was undeniably vastly different from any 
other point in French history.  For the first time, there was explicit acceptance of the presence of 
a sizable portion of the French citizenry not in communion with the Catholic Church. At odds 
with previous domestic policy and now at odds with the church, the Edict of Nantes resembled 
                                                          
29
 Holt, 156.  
30
 Ibid, 166.  
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nothing less than a tacit acceptance of the encroaching nature of secularism as a result of 
Protestant gains made throughout the French wars of religion.  
The Edict consisted of four, distinct documents broken down into some 92 general 
articles, 56 secret articles dealing with individual towns and two royal brevets. These brevets, 
which dealt with financial compensation for Protestant church officials and military protection in 
Protestant held cities, need not be registered by the French parlements, could be summarily 
withdrawn at the whim of a king, and could later be overturned by a subsequent ruler.
31
 More 
generally, the Edict addressed the terms by which Huguenots would coexist with their French 
brethren, and this portion was ratified by the parlements thus demonstrating a far-reaching 
commitment to the terms set forth under the Edict.
32
 To further this commitment, over one-third 
of the Edict’s articles dealt with the fair administration of justice and equal access to the court 
system for Protestants. Margolf writes:  
During the Wars of Religion, Huguenots complained that the parlements—the highest royal law 
courts in the French judicial hierarchy—were composed of predominantly Catholic magistrates 
and were therefore inherently hostile to Huguenot litigants. Huguenots demanded special tribunals 
(or at least the inclusion of Huguenot judges in royal law courts) in order to assure a fair hearing 
of their legal disputes, along with the share of political power and social status which accompanied 
judicial office. Such arrangements had a complex and troubled history during the later sixteenth 
century; in 1598, the Edict of Nantes provided a new legal foundation for the Huguenots access to 
royal justice.
33
 
 
Although the primary outcome of the Edict of Nantes was peace, the inclusion of a reformed 
legal system meant to directly address Protestant grievances would prove equally significant. If 
Protestants possessed an avenue for legal redress, then they might be more apt to participate in 
the colonial endeavor. A country at peace could participate fully in the colonial endeavor, using 
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resources to counter European rivals and not its own populace. Although likely an unintended 
but nonetheless fortunate consequence of the Edict, many within the Protestant community 
possessed significant sea-faring experience, which would only help the larger causes of the 
French state. Indeed, Guillaume de Caën’s company would make use of the French legal 
system—at times successfully—to address grievances pertaining to their own colonial 
endeavors.    
At first glance, Toussaint Dubreuil’s 1600 portrait of Henri IV depicted as Hercules 
slaying the Lernaean Hydra
34
 seems to suggest definitive Protestant victory over the vaunted 
Catholic league. In actuality however, Dubreuil’s choice of imagery deftly reflected the changing 
nature of religion and politics following the carefully negotiated agreement. This was not a 
depiction of Protestant forces triumphing over Catholic. Instead it reaffirmed the supremacy of 
the French monarchy, and demonstrated what was now possible as religious coexistence became 
the norm. Now that some one million Protestants had been legally recognized as French subjects, 
less overt symbols of Catholic and Gallican power would be needed to represent the crown. Thus 
we see Dubreuil’s choice of the classically heroic Hercules, which replaced the explicit religious 
representations of Henry III. This subtle, yet important distinction between a classical royal 
image and an overtly Christian one nonetheless maintained the idea that kings were in some 
ways still divine.
35
  
The peace established by the 1598 Edict of Nantes gave rise to ample economic 
opportunities for Protestant sea-faring merchants, of which Guillaume de Caën was an integral 
part. It thrust the French into the turbulent waters of the North Atlantic, ready to meet imperial 
foes on distant shores instead of one another in their own homeland. But in many ways, the 
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fundamental changes to the legal system merely reinforced France’s commitment to religious 
pluralism, while also reinvigorating French, co-religious economic enterprises within the 
Atlantic community. As early as 1555 both Catholic and Protestant merchants had engaged in 
efforts to facilitate French economic interests along the coast of Brazil. Seeking to dispel the 
myth that Brazil’s Fort Coligny was meant as a Protestant refuge, historian John McGrath argues 
instead, “it is clear that this colonizing effort in Brazil was the manifestation of a very serious 
attempt by the French crown to claim and establish effective occupation of a vast and potentially 
lucrative part of the New World.”36 Traditional historical interpretations of the endeavor at Fort 
Coligny suggest that this was nothing more than an attempt by Protestants to establish a religious 
haven in the midst of civil war at home. In actuality, McGrath effectively demonstrates that this 
too was a joint effort on behalf of Protestants and Catholics, in service to the crown. Although 
the venture would ultimately fail, McGrath’s study suggests at least a tacit legacy of cooperation 
amongst religious rivals within the Atlantic frontier. That Dubreuil chose to depict Henry IV as a 
classical Hercules figure, vanquishing the multi-headed hydra of the Catholic League, spoke 
volumes about the future of France and its nascent experiment with modern, secular politics. 
This was a sovereign who recognized the potential of the merchant class—while he may have 
been influenced by the politique element within French society he was equally influenced by 
loyal Protestants.
37
 Henry IV’s ability to juggle the seemingly disparate parts of sixteenth century 
French society confirmed his commitment to reason of state, paving the way for the Edict of 
Nantes and the eventual rise of the Compagnie de Caën.  
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The Compagnie de Caën 
The Atlantic seemingly encouraged an explicitly secularist model of colonization from a 
French perspective in the early stages of the seventeenth century. Particularly amongst the 
Atlantic merchant community there appeared a movement committed to curtailing religious 
extremism. According to Liewain Van Doren, as early as 1570 there was a “movement that cut 
across religious divisions and was characterized by a conscious subordination of religious 
differences (where) Catholics and Protestants alike joined a common secular cause.”38 McGrath 
has shown, Protestant and Catholic efforts at colonization began in earnest in the South Atlantic 
as early as 1555. In the North Atlantic, French Protestants would enjoy at least partial control of 
the lucrative fur trade in Canada in 1588, and in doing so take on markedly increased 
responsibilities in the colonial administration and maintenance of New France. From 1588 until 
1620 no fewer than eight different trading companies held exclusive rights of trade in New 
France.
39
 The religious makeup of these companies reflected the shift towards efforts at religious 
toleration as advocated by King Henry IV. The structure of these earliest companies, privately 
funded yet regulated by the crown and often required to subsidize colonization, was erratic at 
best.
40
 Described by historian Peter Moogk as “French colonialism on the cheap” the system 
would ultimately prove difficult to sustain.
41
 The alleged tightfistedness of the French monarchy 
in colonizing efforts in the North Atlantic should not detract from the substantial contributions of 
these companies during New France’s foundational period.  
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The most important of these companies, the Compagnie de Caën, was founded in 1620, 
at the behest of French Viceroy Montmorency.
42
 The last of the pseudo-private trading 
companies and the last with official Protestant leadership, its organizational composition 
revealed the possibilities of a cosmopolitan New France. Scant documentary evidence makes it 
difficult to ascertain the exact structure of the Compagnie de Caën, yet we do know that the 
company was born in a competitive environment, where a variety of minor nobles and merchants 
sought special privileges from the crown to gain an advantage in the New World. Traditionally, 
these companies adopted a structure that had arisen in the Middle Ages.  Risk was spread 
amongst company investors, and amongst a wide array of ships.
43
 We can be confident that the 
company and the de Caën family itself was divided between Catholic and Protestant interests. 
Guillaume, the Protestant leader, and Emery, his Catholic nephew, held the monopoly for nearly 
seven years until the emergence of Richelieu’s Compagnie des Cent-Associes.  In addition, the 
subordinates within the Compagnie de Caën were also of mixed faith.
44
  Documentary evidence 
will demonstrate that Guillaume was the primary architect of the Compagnie de Caën, whereas 
Emery served in a support role, often piloting ships on his uncle’s behalf to the new world. Much 
of this study’s analysis will focus on Guillaume’s role as the company’s architect, paying close 
attention to the way in which his Protestantism affected the status of the company both in the 
New World and in France.  
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The timing of the rise of the Compagnie de Caën and its stability over a seven year 
period would also prove revealing. Formed some ten years after Henry IV’s death and in the 
midst of significant Protestant rebellion in France, the choice to appoint a trading company of 
such evident diversity suggests that the legacy of the Edict of Nantes and a commitment to 
secular politics was firmly in place.
45
 A 1620 letter from Henri Montmorency, then Viceroy of 
New France, informed Champlain of the revocation of the Compagnie de Rouen et Saint-Malo’s 
charter. Montmorency writes:  
Mr. Champlain- 
For several reason I have thought it right to exclude the shareholders from Rouen and St. Malo in 
the trade to New France from returning to that country. And, to render you assistance and provide 
you with what is necessary, I have chosen the Sieurs de Caën, uncle and nephew, and their 
associates; the first is a good merchant and the second a good sea-captain, so that he will be able to 
help you effectually and cause the authority of the King to be recognized in those distant regions 
under my government. I recommend you to assist him and those who shall go out with his 
authority, against all others, in order to maintain them in the enjoyment of the privileges which I 
have granted to them.
46
 
 
Those “several reasons” seem to allude to two distinct matters. First, increased Protestant 
insurrection from precisely those territories at home forced Montmorency’s decision to 
reconsider the allegiances of the shareholders from Rouen and St. Malo. Additionally, and 
perhaps more pressing to the matter of colonization, the Compagnie de Rouen et Saint-Malo 
failed tremendously in meeting even the most minimal goals for support.
47
 Moreover, 
Montmorency’s letter is revealing for what it does not say. In the letter he neglects to mention 
Guillaume de Caën’s religious background as a Protestant, rather choosing to describe him as a 
“good merchant.”  Similarly, his description of Emery as a “good sea-captain” demonstrates the 
necessity of skilled men in the treacherous currents of the North Atlantic.  Montmorency’s focus 
on the talents and abilities of the de Caëns as opposed to their religious preference thus 
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demonstrates the importance of knowledge over religion. Pragmatism and a willingness to 
appoint the best man for the job on behalf of the better interests of the French Canadian colonies 
undoubtedly played some role in Montmorency’s decision.  But in a time of increasing tensions 
between Catholics and Protestants at home, there remained a devotion to the tenets of toleration 
as espoused in the Edict of Nantes, at least within the realm of the Atlantic. Protestants would 
continue to be marginalized in the sphere of domestic politics, but would maintain primacy as an 
economic force in the French Atlantic world.  
The 1620 appointment of the de Caëns also coincided with an important restructuring of 
colonial administration within the government of France. The key creation during this period was 
that of the Office of Intendant for New France, which David Hackett Fischer describes as an 
“instrument of royal absolutism.”48  Prior to this development, both Champlain and the trading 
company in power were left with little supervision within New France. Montmorency’s creation 
of Office of the Intendant for New France allowed for greater royal oversight within the 
colony—it also afforded the newly formed Compagnie de Caën a previously unrealized level of 
legitimacy within New France. This reorganization rendered the Compagnie de Rouen et Saint-
Malo obsolete. The incident, although ultimately empowering to Champlain, did not grant him 
absolute authority in New France as Fischer suggests.
49
   
Champlain’s authority and the limits of religious tolerance would soon be tested—a 
consistent theme throughout the early stages of New France. Although Montmorency may have 
been unconcerned with the religion of Guillaume de Caen, Champlain was not. Responding in 
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his diary to Montmorency’s letter appointing Guillaume de Caën head of the newly formed 
trading company, he wrote, “As to the Sieur de Caën (Guillaume), although he was of the 
opposite religion (Huguenot), there were great hopes of his becoming a Catholic.”50 Striking a 
similar tone, Recollect priest Gabriel Sagard, member of the first Compagnie de Caën expedition 
to New France called Guillaume de Caën a “liberal and understanding man,” and like Champlain 
hoped he might one day convert to Catholicism.
51
 Both Champlain and Sagard echo the ‘one 
faith’ sentiment that characterized many Catholics understanding of the intended goal of the 
Edict of Nantes. Although toleration remained the official policy, most Catholics in French 
society firmly believed in the necessity of a nation rooted in religious unity, whereas Protestants 
emphasized the ‘perpetual and irrevocable’ nature of tolerance, as expressed in the Edict’s 
preamble. Once more, the level of tolerance granted by way of the Edict of Nantes depended 
largely on who was in charge and at what point in the seventeenth century they were interpreting 
the Edict. Prior to Guillaume de Caën’s arrival Champlain was given explicit instructions 
regarding his, and others’, religious practices, and limitations on just how open New France 
would become. He wrote, “And as to the exercise of his religion, I was to tell him that he was not 
to practise (sic) it either on land or on sea; and as to anything further I was to use my own 
judgment.”52 The order, a direct command from the recently named Intendant, Jean-Jacques 
Dolu, demonstrated that although Protestantism would be tolerated in the colonies, overt 
demonstrations of faith could potentially be censured. Interestingly, this largely paralleled the 
parameters set forth in the Edict of Nantes, which mandated matters of practice, not beliefs.
53
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Champlain’s concerns over de Caën’s religion were warranted. Conflict arose in 1622 
between the newly appointed group, whose associates were of mixed faith, and colonists already 
in New France. In one such confrontation two associates of Guillaume de Caën, incidentally both 
Catholic, clashed over how Catholics and Protestants ought to properly worship in the tightly 
confined areas of a Compagnie de Caën naval vessel. In the dispute, “La Ralde,” Guillaume de 
Caën’s first lieutenant, feuded with “Hebert,” a subordinate to both men. Champlain recounts: 
The dispute came to be one on the subject of religion, although bother were 
Roman Catholics. De Caën himself (Guillaume) belonged to the so-called 
Reformed Religion, and was accustomed to have prayers said in his cabin in the 
stern of the vessel, while the Catholics were at their devotions in the bow. While 
Hebert was in charge, the prayers went on as when the chief was there; but when 
La Ralde arrived as lieutenant and commander, he wanted the Catholics to come 
and do their praying in the cabin, and the so-called Reformers should be in their 
proper place, and do theirs in the bow.
54
 
 
Ultimately the matter appeared more a dispute over failure to recognize hierarchy and rank, but 
that religion served as a flashpoint demonstrated the tension-filled atmosphere in which these 
men existed.  Champlain continues writing, “A great dispute arose, which was appeased by the 
intervention of some Recollet Fathers. Hebert was in the wrong in this quarrel, and was not 
reasonable about it.”55  Ironically, Champlain’s judgment following the incident actually 
supported the Protestant side. Hebert had broken the stated chain of command, and although he 
was attempting to favor Catholic interests, both Champlain and select Recollect Fathers 
supported the Protestant side in this instance. Perhaps their interests lie in solely maintaining 
order, but order in support of the Protestant cause suggested a degree of acceptance for the 
opposite religion. 
                                                          
54
 Works, 5: 85-86. Of further significance is Champlain’s use of the word “chief” in describing Guillaume de Caen. 
While there are no doubt potential issues in LeSeur’s translation, the use of the word “chief” still suggests that 
Guillaume de Caen held a position of authority over Champlain.  
55
 Ibid, 86 
 23 
 
 Although this incident favored Protestant interests, and ultimately the secular authority of 
the Compagnie de Caën, there would be continued tension between Protestant and Catholic 
rivals within the colony. A similar issue over proper worship practices sprang up in 1626, when a 
number of Protestant sailors violated restrictions on psalm-singing following the departure of 
Emery de Caën, then second in command of the company.
56
 In recounting the experience, 
Champlain writes: 
On the fourteenth of the same month, Father La Nouë arrived from Tadoussac, and told us that 
since Emery had left there, the sailors had paid no attention to the restrictions that he had left at his 
departure in the matter of psalm-singing; they went on with it in spite of these, and in such a way 
that all the savages could hear them from the shore. There is no use in talking to them; it is their 
great zeal for their faith that impels them.
57
  
 
David Hackett Fischer references this same incident choosing to expound on Champlain’s ability 
to mediate the difficult religious environment.
58
  In actuality, Champlain did nothing to address 
the situation, choosing instead to ignore the overzealous psalm-singing.  Again, we see a tacit 
acceptance of the religious environment of New France. 
 In addition to creating a more liberal religious environment the Compagnie de Caën also 
made significant contributions to the infrastructural base of Quebec, and ultimately paved the 
way for more complete colonization of New France. As a semi-private commercial, company, 
profits were the primary motivation, yet the basis of the monopoly rights also required the 
company to support colonization.
59
  Thus, an analysis of the company based on material success 
must also measure their level of contribution to the overall well-being of the colony. Like all of 
the commercial companies in early New France, the Compagnie de Caën maintained an uneasy 
balance between its desire to profit via the fur trade and its responsibilities as colonizers in the 
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New World. The specific requirements of the agreement for the Compagnie de Caën required it 
to pay Champlain’s salary and to establish six Recollet missionaries and to settle six families in 
New France—both of which it met easily.  It is more difficult to quantify just how successful the 
Compagnie de Caën was via the fur trade, yet there are indications that its business was 
lucrative.  Following the eventual revocation of the Compagnie de Caën’s monopoly, a 
complaint lodged in 1642 to the royal council on behalf of the Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France 
references a payment of some 150,000 livres to Guillaume de Caën for reimbursement following 
his loss of the fur trade monopoly.
60
 Guillaume De Caën’s success in obtaining this 
reimbursement, in conjunction with the Compangnie de la Nouvelle-France’s consternation over 
the amount of payment, suggests relative success for the company while still in its existence, as 
well as a court system more sympathetic to Protestant legal claims—a direct result of the Edict of 
Nantes. Gayle Brunelle offers further contextual evidence for the economic success of the 
Compagnie de Caën. In her examination on profit and economic security amongst the sixteenth 
and seventeenth century merchant classes, writing, “In the midsixteenth century personal wealth 
in the range even of twenty thousand livres constituted an impressive accumulation of capital.”61  
Furthermore, in 1624 Guillaume de Caën obtained a seigneurial grant for Cap Tourmente, 
a tract of agricultural land surrounding Quebec, an achievement unrealized by his Protestant 
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predecessors.
62
 Seigneurial grants, what essentially amounted to French feudal land titles, helped 
divide the land amongst prominent members of French society. Although the implication of de 
Caën’s seigneurial title and the role of the seigneurial system was largely symbolic in the early 
stages of New France, it was nonetheless of great magnitude.
63
 According to Brunelle, “Most 
merchants aspired to achieve a fortune based at least in part on landed wealth. Only a minority of 
the investors possessing the means to acquire substantial landholdings failed to do so. Land was 
the only really secure foundation capable of allowing them or their descendants to adopt the 
genteel lifestyle indispensable to noble status.”64 For the first time in Canada’s history, the 
Huguenot leader of a commercial monopoly was also given an important landholding title, a 
development that must not be understated. In the early seventeenth century, the seignuerial 
system was the primary method of land distribution, which served to encourage permanent 
settlement. Although just one example, and largely symbolic, it nonetheless reveals both the 
preeminence of Guillaume de Caën and the potential for a French Canadian society shaped not 
by division, but by cohesion.   
Coinciding with de Caën’s attaining of the seigneurial grant, the colony witnessed 
important infrastructural improvements, which would encourage greater self-sufficiency.  
Historian Bruce Trigger examines these contributions, writing:  
It is wrong to conclude that the de Caëns sought only to draw profits from the fur trade and that 
they totally ignored settlement. Their company financed the construction of the fort at Quebec and 
replaced the wooden habitation with a new stone structure. The new habitations consisted of two 
wings with defensive turrets at the four corners, while a semi-circular fortification commanded the 
river and moats surrounded the entire structure.
65
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The replacement of the wooden structure with a more permanent stone one suggests the de Caëns 
were committed to New France for the entirety of their monopoly, and beyond. In order to 
protect their investment and to ease life in the New World, they committed resources to 
establishing a permanent presence and to the defense of the colony.  This commitment to defense 
was not unwarranted.   
Challenges to the monopoly, both from fellow countrymen and other Europeans, were 
persistent in the lucrative fur trading grounds of Canada.  Champlain references two particular 
incidents involving smugglers from La Rochelle while the monopoly was in the hands of the de 
Caëns.  Champlain’s depiction of the events presents a dramatic portrayal of the contested 
economic environment and of the precarious religious divisions within New France. He writes, 
“…near Tadoussac he (Guillaume de Caën) had met with a small smuggler from La Rochelle, of 
about forty-five tons, and had got so close to her, that talking could be heard from ship to ship, 
both being under sail; but that the one from La Rochelle being the better sailer, had got away. A 
fine chance was thus lost, for the crew of that vessel had done a large trade in furs.”66 In a later 
incident, again involving smugglers from La Rochelle, Champlain evokes the natural imagery of 
the landscape in describing the encounter, writing “After our departure, Sieur de Caën sent a 
vessel to the spot, but it was too late; the birds had flown a day or two earlier. Nothing was found 
but the nest, a kind of palisade that they had erected to guard against surprise while they were 
trading. The palisade was torn down and burnt.”67   
It is Champlain’s characterization of the smugglers as hailing from La Rochelle that is 
most important here. As La Rochelle was the largest Protestant stronghold in France, one can 
deduce these illegal traders were Huguenots.  Throughout Champlain’s writings he references 
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interactions with Protestants, both positive and negative, quite carefully.  In this specific 
instance, Champlain’s word choice of “La Rochelle”—the Protestant state within the French 
state—imparts to his reader subtle, yet vital clues about the ambiguous nature of identity in the 
seventeenth century Atlantic World. Rather than describing these illegal traders as mere 
Protestants, or of the “Reformed Religion,” he specifically references their home city—a city 
that would remain a bastion of Protestant extremism until the late 1620s. This was in stark 
contrast from standard accounts of interactions with Protestants like Guillaume de Caën.  
Furthering the complexity of this relationship was Guillaume de Caën’s role in the encounters.  
The tensions between the Compagnie de Caën and the illegal La Rochelle traders pitted 
Protestant against Protestant, all while the company served under the auspices of the Catholic 
king, Louis XIII. The conflict represented a move away from extremism that had plagued both 
sides throughout the sixteenth century. Cooperation was possible amongst former Protestant and 
Catholic rivals and New France and the Compagnie de Caën provided the impetus for this 
collaboration. Yet this partnership remained tenuous. In trying to protect his economic interests, 
Guillaume de Caën actively sought the destruction of his Protestant brethren on behalf of a 
Catholic king and nation, which would soon revoke his exclusive monopoly, lay siege to the 
most important Protestant city in France, and deny the hard-earned rights of toleration that had 
helped create the colony of New France. 
The gradual decline of the Compagnie de Caën began with the ascension of Cardinal 
Armand Jean du Plessis de Richelieu.  Under Richelieu’s tutelage, France would adopt a more 
restrictive religious policy within Canada, yet at the same time would make alliances with 
Protestant factions during the Thirty Years War.  While Richelieu’s broader, foreign policy was 
conflicted, his policy for New France was clear—the eventual exclusion of all Protestants from 
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New France. But, the decline of the Compagnie de Caën would not happen overnight.  At first, a 
reorganization took place within the company which weakened the direct influence of Guillaume 
de Caën, but did not eliminate his authority entirely.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the issue of 
religious practice in the packed quarters of a company vessel, in conjunction with negative 
reports from Catholic priests in New France, had sealed Guillaume de Caën’s fate.68  Richelieu’s 
ascension coupled with the 1625 resignation of Montmorency, one of Guillaume’s staunchest 
advocates, meant that he now lacked the necessary support within royal circles to maintain his 
grip on the monopoly.
69
 As a result, the new viceroy, Ventadour, required de Caën to name a 
Catholic to command the company’s ships. In recounting the period of tense negotiation 
Champlain writes:  
Sieur de Caën came to Paris, where he met with a good deal of opposition from the old 
shareholders (from the Compagnie de Rouen and Saint-Malo) which brought on proceedings 
amongst them before the Council, with the expectation that they would come to a friendly 
understanding between the two parties. Besides this, his Lordship (Ventadour) was dissatisfied 
with the Sieur de Caën owing to the report which had reach him that he had caused prayers of their 
so-called [Reformed] Religion to be said publicly within the river St. Lawrence, and had desired 
Catholics to attend them, a thing which his Lordship had forbidden him to do. These accusations 
the Sieur de Caën denied, saying that it was all hatred and malice on the part of his rivals , who 
were stirring up all the trouble they could against him.
70
 
 
In spite of the recriminations against him, the body of evidence sides overwhelmingly with 
Guillaume de Caën. Why would de Caën, who had grown increasingly wealthy and remained 
steadfastly committed to the colonization of New France, choose to incite conflict within New 
France over seemingly mundane religious customs? His actions routinely proved he was not an 
extremist.  He had little motive to do so and had long been comfortable with the system of 
toleration established after the Edict of Nantes. Furthermore, he had sought to eliminate the 
illegal La Rochelle smugglers, who were in all likelihood also Protestant.  While there had 
certainly been discord amongst Protestants and Catholics in New France during the reign of the 
                                                          
68
 Ibid, 402-405.  
69
 Fischer, 392. 
70
 Works 5: 150 
 29 
 
Compagnie de Caën, it paled in comparison to the situation in France, where tensions between 
Protestants and Catholics continued to escalate. Nonetheless, Guillaume de Caën would need to 
make significant concessions in order to maintain even a portion of his monopoly.  After what 
Champlain called a “great deal of contention,” new terms were agreed upon in which Guillaume 
de Caën was required to pay a percentage of new capital investment in the colony and to appoint 
a Catholic to command his vessels.  His right to travel to New France was also revoked.
71
   
Undaunted and committed to participating in at least some capacity in the Atlantic 
endeavor, Guillaume de Caën continued to prepare his ships for the trans-Atlantic voyage, and, 
as Champlain writes, “to put on board such things as he judged necessary for the settlement in 
Quebec.”72 Although dedicated to the long-term success of Quebec, he was still a merchant at 
heart.  A number of Catholic priests, along with a crew of some twenty workmen sought passage 
to New France during this same period. Now prohibited from visiting New France, Guillaume de 
Caën, recognizing the opportunity and possessing the resources to do so, contracted a boat to the 
men at a cost of 3,500 livres.
73
  This amount more than covered the required percentage of 
reinvestment as stated in the new terms of his company’s monopoly.  Although de Caën was 
legally barred from traveling to New France, he could still play an important role in contributing 
to the colonies well-being, and make a living by doing so.  Perhaps recognizing his grip on the 
monopoly was growing increasingly fragile, and seeking to clear his name from the accusations 
presented at the royal council, de Caën undertook  a last ditch effort to convince those aboard his 
ships of his innocence.  Champlain recalled the seemingly incessant delays prior to their 
departure, writing:  
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We were in the roadsted until the twentieth of the said month (April, 1626), when we weighed 
anchor and got under way at one o’clock in the afternoon, but merely tacked to and fro waiting for 
the Sieur de Caën, who wanted to give some order to the said La Ralde and Emery his nephew. 
About six o’clock in the evening de Caën arrived, administered the oath to the said La Ralde and 
the men of his crew, and gave the instructions which he desired should be followed on the voyage; 
after which he read publicly before the whole crew and others a small book containing a number 
of things which he was accused of having done.
74
 
 
This was in many ways, de Caën’s farewell to his monopoly.  Although he still maintained a 
marginal level of control, he nonetheless realized his power and influence was slipping away. 
Champlain does not include what de Caën said, only writing “there were some present…who 
were not particularly pleased.”75  As many of the men on the ship had worked for Guillaume de 
Caën for some time, one can assume those “who were not particularly pleased” were in 
Richelieu’s inner circle, and were overtly Catholic, and thus unhappy with de Caën’s presence on 
the ship.  Curiously, Champlain does not weigh in on the matter.  Perhaps he too recognized the 
future state of affairs for New France.  He had worked in the service of the Compagnie de Caën 
for nearly half a decade at this point and had witnessed significant gains for the colony, even 
bringing his wife to New France during the period.
76
  The course of New France was about to 
change significantly.  The rise of Richelieu and the decline of religious tolerance within Canada, 
coupled with increased warfare at home and the subsequent extension of military action into the 
Atlantic World, would ultimately threaten the very existence of the colony. 
 In the spring of 1627 the Compagnie de Caën would finally lose its monopoly and 
trading privileges in New France.  Richelieu established the Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France 
(also called Compagnie des Cent-Associes), a collection of one hundred stockholders, all 
Catholic.
77
  The message could not have been clearer; Richelieu intended for New France to be a 
purely Catholic colony.  It is crucial to understand the complexity of the politico-religious 
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environment in Europe during this period to appreciate the significance of Richelieu’s decision.  
The 1627 Catholic siege of the Protestant stronghold, La Rochelle, signaled an important 
breakdown in domestic Catholic-Protestant affairs, as well as a collapse of foreign relations 
between France and England. Richelieu, for his part, would eventually ally with Protestant forces 
against the rival Catholic Hapsburg family in 1631—something previously inconceivable in the 
throes of Reformation Europe.  Thus, we see just a glimpse of the intricacy of international 
affairs during this period. But where does de Caën factor into the equation?  Following his loss 
of the monopoly in New France, the Compagnie des Cent-Associes took control of colonization 
efforts. Unfortunately for Richelieu they would not maintain possession of the colony for very 
long.  
 
Merchant Rivalry and New France Dispossessed  
That the near immediate demise of the Compagnie des Cent-Associes and the loss of 
French possessions in Canada came at the hands of the Kirke brothers demonstrated Richelieu’s 
complete misunderstanding of the vital role Protestants played in shaping the Atlantic World.  
The colony of New France had been supported, administered, and largely governed by Huguenot 
interests dating back to 1588. While the colony did not grow tremendously over this period, it 
was nonetheless a stable settlement that demonstrated promise for the near future. Any potential 
failings of New France were a result of inconsistent royal policies stemming from an 
unwillingness to fully recognize the potential of the Canadian experiment. Although it possessed 
ample resources, the Compagnie des Cent-Associes lacked the knowledge of the North Atlantic 
that Protestants had possessed for over three decades. The Compagnie des Cent-Associes was 
comprised of native, Catholic Frenchmen—men with little to no experience navigating the 
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Atlantic or navigating the interconnected web of the Protestant international that had arisen 
following centuries of European warfare. Left largely to their own devices, independent trading 
companies like the Compagnie de Caën and the Merchant Adventurers to Canada cultivated 
important connections within the Atlantic world, with other Protestant groups, and with native 
groups in and around New France. These allies would prove crucial in an area still largely devoid 
of explicit imperial control.  
Evidence suggests that the 1627 siege of the Protestant stronghold at La Rochelle directly 
contributed to the rise of the Kirke brothers and their eventual takeover of Quebec.
78
 Like de 
Caën, the Kirkes were byproducts of an Atlantic world that helped foster conceptions of identity 
and allegiance that trended towards cosmopolitan.  Born to an English father and French mother, 
their family had close ties to the merchant community that that flourished between England and 
the port cities in Flanders and France. We do know that they were in all likelihood Protestant and 
while there is limited documentary evidence to corroborate clues about their early life, the 
English House of Lords did pass an act naturalizing the Kirke children in 1621.
79
  Champlain 
himself offers further proof.  Commenting on his surrender of Quebec to Lewis Kirke, he wrote: 
But Louis Kirke was courteous, and, although the son of a Scotchman who had married at Dieppe, 
he was French in disposition and always had a liking for the French Nation; consequently he 
wished to induce these families and other Frenchmen, as far as he was able, to remain in this 
place, finding intercourse and conversation with them more agreeable than with the English, to 
whom his nature seemed to be adverse.
80
 
 
What Champlain meant by the phrase “French Nation” is difficult to discern. Nonetheless 
this affirmation of the apparent duality of the Kirkes identity further supports the idea that 
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the Atlantic helped transform traditional perceptions of self. The apparent amorphous 
nature of identity for the Kirke brothers can help us to understand the motivations and 
allegiance of Guillaume de Caën, even in the face of personal and professional disgrace. 
If one could see oneself as Scottish, French, and Protestant—and choose willingly to 
support the English state against the French state—then being both French and Protestant, 
yet remaining in the service of an increasingly hostile homeland, was also possible.  
Richelieu’s failure to recognize the complexities of Protestant identity in the French 
Atlantic cost him New France and left a black mark on the Compagnie des Cent-
Associes. He would learn his lesson quickly, however, eventually relenting on his 
decision to preclude Guillaume de Caën’s involvement in the colonial administration of 
New France. He might be able to stamp out Protestants as a political force in France, but 
he could not preclude them from remaining a dominant economic and social force in the 
greater Atlantic World.  
The 1632 Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye would eventually restore Quebec to the French, 
but only through careful diplomacy by the de Caëns in the interceding years could this take 
place.  As early as 1630, less than two years after Quebec fell to the Kirke brothers, Guillaume 
de Caën appealed to the English courts for damages resulting from the Kirkes’ conquest.  An 
official affidavit dated April 12, 1630 lists “Wil. de Caën” as “General of the Fleet of New 
France.”81  The title “General of the Fleet of New France” is important, because although de 
Caën was not included as a member of the Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France, it nonetheless 
seems as though he sustained his political influence and professional reputation within the 
Atlantic world.  One must wonder what motivated Guillaume de Caën to continue to serve a 
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country which had taken so much from him.  Additionally, why would Richelieu rescind de 
Caën’s monopoly yet grant him the obviously prominent position of “General of the Fleet of 
New France”? Two weeks later the records indicate de Caën appointed a “Jacques Reynard” to 
act in his absence, as he could no longer stay in England.
82
  Although Guillaume de Caën had 
been barred from activity in New France, he nonetheless played an important role in the 
reclamation of debts, goods, and the colony itself from English hands.  
 Only when the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye was ratified by both the French and 
English monarchs could New France ever be restored fully. Champlain had worked tirelessly 
from 1629 to 1632 while in France, hoping to expedite the situation.  Fischer proposes that 
Champlain’s efforts were ultimately responsible for the eventual agreement between the two 
nations.
83
  Fischer’s findings are questionable however.  Champlain had fallen out of favor 
amongst both Richelieu and Louis XIII following the loss of Quebec. Richelieu had committed 
enormous effort and resources aimed at securing New France following the revocation of the 
Compagnie de Caën monopoly only to see it fall into the hands of the English a year later.  He 
could not have been pleased with Champlain’s efforts in defending the territory, and thus it is 
unlikely he would have been swayed by Champlain’s desire to return to the colony so soon after 
its demise. The text of the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye is most damaging to the assertion that 
Champlain was the central figure responsible for the return of Quebec to the French.  In the 
entire body of the treaty Champlain is mentioned only once, this referring to a deposition on the 
goods present at the fort when it was surrendered.  Guillaume de Caën meanwhile is referenced 
four times, and in each instance it involves a vital portion of the treaty pertaining to 
compensation or administration.  The most revealing element of the treaty cites specific 
                                                          
82
 Ibid, 112-114. 
83
 Fischer, 436. 
 35 
 
reimbursement for his losses—a substantial some for the period, reflecting the success of the 
Compagnie de Caën. It reads:  
Further, the Sieur Burlamachy on behalf of his Majesty of Great Britain for and in the name of his 
said Majesty, at the request and command of the said Lord Ambassador in accord with the order 
the latter has from the King, and also in his proper and private name, has promised and does 
promise to pay to the said General de Caen in two months, from the day and date of the signature 
of these Presents, for all and each of the said peltries, knives, debts due by the Indians to the said 
General de Caen, and other merchandise to him belonging found in the said Forts of Kebec in the 
year 1629 the sum of 820,70c1 livres Tours currency, and further to have restored and given up to 
him in England the barque named the Helene [with] rigging, cannon, munitions and appurtenances 
according to the memoir which has been proved before the Lord of the Council of England.There 
shall further be restored to the said General de Caen in the establishment of Quebec all the casks 
of biscuits, barrels of peas, prunes, raisins, flour, and other merchandise and provisions for 
bartering which were in the said barque when she was taken in the year 1629, together with the 
merchandise belonging to him, which have been unloaded and left last year at Kebec in the River 
S. Laurent, country of New France.
84
 
 
Guillaume de Caën, not Champlain was the central figure responsible for the retaking of 
New France.  Two additional pieces of documentary evidence support this assertion.  First an 
agreement between Richelieu and Guillaume de Caen document entitled, sets the terms for the 
French takeover of  the colony and fort from the English.
85
  In this document we again see the 
terminology “General of the Fleet of New France” in describing Guillaume de Caën, thus 
confirming the English affidavit of 1630.  But what is more compelling is the description of de 
Caën. The document, a series of terms between Cardinal Richelieu and Guillaume de Caën for 
the takeover of Quebec, asserts, “no one is more capable to take control of the country” and that 
de Caën’s familiarity with the people and the region will allow him to maintain control.86  This 
choice of language and willingness to grant de Caën the central, administrative positions 
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represents a significant shift in Richelieu’s foreign policy and suggests that even in the midst of 
increased restrictions on Protestants at home, there was still recognition of the value of Protestant 
involvement in the colonial endeavor.   Furthermore, the document guarantees the de Caëns a 
monopoly on the fur trade for a period of one year, until the arrival of a new company.
87
 Perhaps 
de Caën’s years of quiet service to the nation and performance as commander of the fleet of New 
France impelled Richelieu’s change of heart.  Additionally, Guillaume de Caën’s Protestantism 
might have been viewed as advantageous in this incident.  The circumstances require him to 
obtain an English-held fort in a trans-Atlantic world rife with potential danger.  For most of his 
life, de Caën seemingly acted as a political and religious intermediary within the Atlantic World, 
and thus the situation was familiar to him.  While difficult to ascertain, this document 
nonetheless supports the assertion of Guillaume de Caën’s centrality in the reclamation of 
Quebec.  
 In conjunction with this document exists an employment contract for forty workers to 
serve in the recovered colony. The contract sets forth terms of three years for each of the men, 
but what is more noteworthy is the personal information provided for each man.  The makeup of 
the list suggests an effort to once again establish a more permanent settlement—and once again, 
it is under the direction of Guillaume de Caën. A number of carpenters, coopers, tool-makers and 
a doctor, are all listed.
88
  There is an additional, peculiar aspect to the document.  For most men, 
both a hometown and Catholic parish are given next to their name.  Others however, possess 
only a hometown with no mention of a parish.  For many of these same men, their hometowns, 
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places like Dieppe and Rouen, possessed substantial Protestant populations.
89
 What does the 
absence of parish and presence of typically Protestant cities tell us? Were these men Huguenots?   
While speculative, perhaps de Caën was able once again collect a company of men committed to 
the tolerant New France that had existed earlier in the century.   
 Clearly Guillaume de Caën still suffered a marginalized status within French society, 
even after obtaining the monopoly in New France again in 1632.  The terms of the monopoly 
were to be terminated after only one year.  Nonetheless, he had survived and, in many ways, 
thrived in the tumultuous politico-religious milieu of the seventeenth century Atlantic. His 
continued service to his country, even in the face of seemingly insurmountable odds, afforded 
him considerable influence in the Catholic-dominated government of his mother country.  While 
he would never regain his position of prominence in New France, he would continue to garner 
accolades and titles for his service.  In 1633, Richelieu would further compensate de Caën, 
naming him Baron of the Bahamas.  Richelieu’s gift of the barony, however, was a cruel kind of 
benevolence—terms of the title forbade de Caën from transporting Protestants to the islands.90  
Still, the gesture demonstrated something symbolically important about de Caën’s life, indeed 
about the lives of many in the seventeenth century.   
 
Conclusion 
Gilles Paquet and Jean-Pierre Wallot’s essay “Nouvelle France/Quebec/Canada: A World of 
Limited Identities” seeks to address the uniqueness of the Canadian experience within the greater 
Atlantic World. In it, they argue “that the inhabitants of the political entity now known as 
Canada never developed anything but limited identities, but that paradoxically those limited 
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identities, rather than reducing ‘national’ communicative competence, may have improved it.”91 
The Canadian experience, particularly at its earliest stages, was shaped by common traits of 
freedom and independence, oftentimes devoid of the French desire for “order, symmetry and 
harmony.”92 Although they utilize the legendary coureurs de bois and the habitants as 
characterizations of these ideals, the Compagnie de Caën and the legacy of Huguenot 
contributions to New France also fall squarely within this realm. French royalists might be able 
to reduce the influence of Protestants in domestic politics, but they could not be ignored in the 
Atlantic. Although Protestants were restricted from settling permanently in New France after 
1627, their presence nonetheless remained. Leslie Choquette presents evidence that suggests 
upwards of 6 percent of those who migrated to New France were of Huguenot lineage—and that 
those of Huguenot background had a higher rate of cultural persistence than their Catholic 
counterparts.
93
 Ultimately, the Atlantic Ocean represented opportunity for seventeenth century 
French Protestants. Granted, this was a limited window of opportunity, but nonetheless it was an 
important one that historians have long ignored.  For de Caën, that opportunity lay at first in the 
lucrative fur trade of New France.  As tensions in France escalated, and the Atlantic World grew 
increasingly competitive and chaotic, economic opportunities diminished—yet the Atlantic still 
offered an alternative to more restrictive policies at home. It was in many ways a third sphere of 
experience, which would transform traditional conceptions of identity throughout the broader 
Atlantic World.  
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
Toussaint Dubreuil, Portrait of French King Henri IV as Hercules Slaying the 
Lernaean Hydra (Catholic League), c. 1600 
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source material produced on this period of early Canada does not assess de Caen contributions in such a favorable 
light. 
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